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Recent Developments

Johnson v. State:
An Inchoate Crime Sentence Shall Not Exceed the Maximum Sentence,
Without Enhancements, of the Target Crime
By Camela J. Chapman

T

he Court of Appeals of
Mary land held that life
imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is not a legal
sentence for conspiracy to commit
murder. Johnson v. State, 2001
Md. LEXIS 18 (2001). The
court's ruling clarified that death
or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole are
"enhanced" sentences for first
degree murder, and thus are
dependant
upon
special
circumstances.
!d. at 6.
Accordingly, when a sentencing
provision provides that the
punishment for an inchoate crime
shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for the target
crime, the provision only
contemplates the basic maximum
sentence available for the target
crime and does not incorporate
the enhanced penalty provisions.
!d. at 11.
On November 10, 1997,
Judy Forrester, a disabled
woman, was found in her home
bound with duct tape and fatally
shot.
Rondell Johnson
("Johnson") was convicted of
murder, robbery, conspiracy to
commit those crimes, and other
offenses.
Johnson was found guilty in
the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County of first-degree
31.2 U. Bait L.F. 20

premeditated murder, robbery
with a deadly weapon, firstdegree burglary, use of a handgun
in the commission of a felony or
crime of violence, conspiracy to
commit murder, and conspiracy to
commit robbery. Johnson was
sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole
for the first-degree premeditated
murder conviction and a
consecutive sentence of life
without parole for the conspiracy
to commit murder. On appeal, the
court of special appeals affirmed
Johnson's sentence. The court of
appeals granted Johnson's
petition for a writ of certiorari to
determine whether life without
parole is a legal sentence for the
crime of conspiracy to commit
murder.
First, the court examined
Maryland case law interpreting
Maryland Code ( 1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 38 and§
412(b). !d. at 4. Section 38
mandates the punishment for
conspiracy and provides that the
punishment cannot exceed the
maximum punishment provided
for the substantive offense. !d. In
addition, § 412(b) provides that
the punishment for first-degree
murder "shall be imprisonment for
life" unless the State seeks death
or life without parole. /d. at 5.

The State must meet other special
conditions for death, or life
without parole. !d. at 5.
Second, the court reviewed
Sucik v. State, which held that
"death and life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole
are enhanced sentences for firstdegree murder, and are
dependent upon special
circumstances," and because an
enhanced punishment is "highly
penal," it has to be strictly
construed. !d. at 7 (citing Sucik
v. State, 344 Md. 611, 616-617,
689 A.2d 78, 80 ( 1997)). The
court remarked "conspiracy" is a
common-law inchoate offense for
which the General Assembly
limited , by statute, the
punishment to the maximum
sentence of the substantive crime.
/d. at 8. The court also observed
that Maryland precedent
recognizes that this limitation on
the conspiracy sentence, in
reference to the maximum
sentence of the substantive or
target offense, means the "basic
maximum sentence of the target
offense and does not include any
enhanced penalty provisions" for
such an offense. /d. The United
States Supreme Court has taken
the same position in construing a
federal statute providing that the
sentence for attempt or
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conspiracy "may not exceed the
punishment prescribed for the
offense which was the object of
the attempt or the conspiracy." /d.
Next, the court reviewed
Deleon v. State, in which the
same sentencing issue was
involved but with a different target
crime. /d. at 11 (citing Deleon
v. State, 102 Md. App. 58, 72,
648 A.2d 1053, 1059 (1968)). In
Deleon, the court held that when
a sentencing provision states that
the punishment for an inchoate
crime shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided
for the target crime, the provision
only contemplates the basic
maximum sentence available for
the target crime and does not
incorporate the enhanced penalty
provisions. /d. Moreover, in
support of its holding, the Deleon
court pointed out, "that parole was
not an inherent part of the judicial
sentencing function and that,
except m those limited
circumstances when the
Legislature has expressly
empowered the courts to impose
no-parole provisions under
certain very specifically designed
circumstances, the parole function
is exclusively within the control of
the executive branch of
government." /d. at 12. Deleon
further pointed out that the
Legislature made provisions for
enhanced penalties for some
particular types of conspiracies
and if they wanted to "specifically
[] provide enhanced penalties for
... conspirators, it knows how to
do so expressly and does not rely

on implication." /d. at 13 (citing
Deleon, 102 Md. App. at 86,
648 A.2d at 1066-1067). The
court held that life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole is
not a legal sentence for conspiracy
to commit murder. Accordingly,
the judgment of the court of
special appeals was reversed. /d.
at 17.
Johnson v. State clarifies
the statutory sentencing provisions
for inchoate offenses in Maryland.
This holding illustrates that the
Maryland Legislature did not
intend to allow trial judges to use
their discretion to enhance the
sentencing penalties of inchoate
crimes. With this holding, the
court informs trial judges that
"enhanced" sentence provisions
are "sentencing options" available
for special cases and special
defendants and are not intended
to apply to inchoate crimes ofthe
target offense.
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